Author Co-author(s) Dismissive Quote type Title Source Link1
1 Brian A. Jacob Thomas S. Dee, Will Dobbie, Jonah Rockoff "…despite widespread concerns over test validity and the manipulation of scores, we know little about the factors that lead educators to manipulate student scores (e.g., accountability policies versus individual students traits). Dismissive The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations, p.1 National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22165, April 2016 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22165
2 Brian A. Jacob Thomas S. Dee, Will Dobbie, Jonah Rockoff "…there is little empirical evidence on whether test score manipulation has any long-run consequences for students' educational outcomes and performance gaps by race, ethnicity, and gender." Dismissive The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations, p.1 National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22165, April 2016 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22165
3 Brian A. Jacob Thomas S. Dee, Will Dobbie, Jonah Rockoff "Our results contribute to an emerging literature that documents both the moral hazard that can be created by test-scoring procedures…. In early work, Jacob and Levitt (2003) find... Dismissive The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations, p.3 National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22165, April 2016 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22165
4 Brian A. Jacob Thomas S. Dee, Will Dobbie, Jonah Rockoff "Our results contribute to an emerging literature that documents both the moral hazard that can be created by test-scoring procedures…. In early work, Jacob and Levitt (2003) find... Dismissive The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations, p.3 National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22165, April 2016 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22165
5 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Eric Taylor, Ben Lindy, Rachel Rosen  "...despite many decades of research, little progress has been made in establishing rigorous methods to select individuals likely to become successful teachers. ... More recent research has shown some promising results ... (Rockoff et al. 2011) ... (Boyd et al. 2008). Only one concurrent study (Goldhaber et al. 2014) examines the extent to which teacher performance can be predicted using data collected as part of an actual hiring process.",  Denigrating Teacher Applicant Hiring and Teacher Performance: Evidence from DC Public Schools  New York Federal Reserve Bank https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/education_seminar_series/jrtlr_teach_dc_23_feb_2015.pdf
6 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Eric Taylor, Ben Lindy, Rachel Rosen  "Selecting more effective teachers among job applicants during the hiring process could be a highly cost-effective means of improving educational quality, but there is little research that links information gathered during the hiring process to subsequent teacher performance.", Abstract Dismissive Teacher Applicant Hiring and Teacher Performance: Evidence from DC Public Schools  New York Federal Reserve Bank https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/education_seminar_series/jrtlr_teach_dc_23_feb_2015.pdf
7 Brian A. Jacob   “And, yet, there is little empirical evidence on whether such incentives will change teacher behavior or improve student achievement.” p. 2 Dismissive The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort University of Michigan & NBER, March 2012 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/07-05-13-BJ.pdf
8 Brian A. Jacob   “In addition, this analysis contributes to the economic literature on employment protection more generally. To the best of my knowledge, it is one of the few empirical studies of the impact of employment protection on worker effort, and the only study to directly examine this issue in the public sector.” p. 4 1stness The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort University of Michigan & NBER, March 2012 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/07-05-13-BJ.pdf
9 Brian A. Jacob   “ . . . the only study to directly examine this issue in the public sector.” p. 4 1stness The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort University of Michigan & NBER, March 2012 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/07-05-13-BJ.pdf
10 Brian A. Jacob   “Surprisingly few studies have examined the impact of employment protection on worker behavior.” p. 5 Dismissive The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort University of Michigan & NBER, March 2012 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/07-05-13-BJ.pdf
11 Brian A. Jacob   “Two recent reviews of pay-for-performance in education conclude that the existing evidence on merit pay is limited and shows mixed results (Springer and Podgursky 2008, Lavy 2008).” p. 6 Dismissive The Effect of Employment Protection on Teacher Effort University of Michigan & NBER, March 2012 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/07-05-13-BJ.pdf
12 Brian A. Jacob Thomas S. Dee “However, there is surprisingly little research on the relationship between school accountability and spending, despite an extensive literature on education finance more generally.” p. 175 Dismissive The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Students, Teachers, and Schools Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall%202010/2010b_bpea_dee.PDF
13 Brian A. Jacob Thomas S. Dee Few studies have implemented regression-based research designs that attempt to isolate the effects of school accountability policies on district, school, and classroom practices from the potentially confounding effects of other determinants.” p. 181 Denigrating The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Students, Teachers, and Schools Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall%202010/2010b_bpea_dee.PDF
14 Brian A. Jacob   “In contrast, there has been remarkably little research on the demand side of the teacher labor market. For example, few studies have examined how principals hire or fire teachers, or how changes in personnel policies might influence teacher quality.” p. 2 Dismissive Do Principals Fire the Worst Teachers? NBER Working Paper No. 15715, February 2010  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~baBrian A. Jacob/w15715_teacher_firing.pdf
15 Brian A. Jacob   This void is not unique to education research. There is a vast economics literature on employee compensation, for example, but relatively few empirical studies that examine the factors that employers consider when hiring or dismissing workers.” p. 3 Dismissive Do Principals Fire the Worst Teachers? NBER Working Paper No. 15715, February 2010  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~baBrian A. Jacob/w15715_teacher_firing.pdf
16 Brian A. Jacob   “While many studies mention the determinants of job displacement, few studies attempt to carefully explore employer preferences for worker characteristics. One important exception is the literature on employer discrimination.” p. 6 Dismissive Do Principals Fire the Worst Teachers? NBER Working Paper No. 15715, February 2010  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~baBrian A. Jacob/w15715_teacher_firing.pdf
17 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Thomas J. Kane, Douglas O. Staiger “Research on the relationship between teachers' characteristics and teacher effectiveness has been underway for over a century, yet little progress has been made in linking teacher quality with factors observable at the time of hire.” p. 1 Dismissive Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One? NBER Working Paper 14485, November 2008 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/w14485.pdf
18 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Thomas J. Kane, Douglas O. Staiger “However, most research on teacher effectiveness has examined a relatively small set of teacher characteristics, such as graduate education and certification . . . researchers’ lack of success in predicting new teacher performance may be driven by a narrow focus on commonly available data.” p. 1 Denigrating Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One? NBER Working Paper 14485, November 2008 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/w14485.pdf
19 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Thomas J. Kane, Douglas O. Staiger “While many studies have been conducted, few definitive conclusions have been made. One reason has been the widespread but controversial use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. …” p. 8 Dismissive Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One? NBER Working Paper 14485, November 2008 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/w14485.pdf
20 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Thomas J. Kane, Douglas O. Staiger “However, there is little work examining the relationship between self-efficacy and student learning.” p. 9 Dismissive Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One? NBER Working Paper 14485, November 2008 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/w14485.pdf
21 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Thomas J. Kane, Douglas O. Staiger “In addition to being one of the first studies of teacher value-added and its correlation with principal evaluations, this paper also finds a significant positive relationship between teachers’ sense of self-efficacy and student achievement growth.” p. 10 1stness Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One? NBER Working Paper 14485, November 2008 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/w14485.pdf
22 Brian A. Jacob Jonah Rockoff, Thomas J. Kane, Douglas O. Staiger “While use of commercial selection instruments has grown considerably, there is little systematic evidence on the power of these instruments for predicting teacher effectiveness.” p. 11 Dismissive Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One? NBER Working Paper 14485, November 2008 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/w14485.pdf
23 Brian A. Jacob Lars Lefgren “The few studies that examine the correlation between principal evaluations and other measures of teacher performance, such as parent or student satisfaction, find similarly weak relationships (Peterson 1987, 2000).” p. 6, note 4 Dismissive Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education June 2007, [eventually published under this title in JEL Vol. 26.2008, 1, p. 101-136]  https://economics.byu.edu/Documents/Lars%20Lefgren/papers/principals.pdf
24 Brian A. Jacob Lars Lefgren “An important feature of most Section 8 programs including Gautreaux and MTO is that they involve voluntary relocation. Only a few studies examine forced relocation.” p. 1 Dismissive Principals as Agents: Subjective Performance Measurement in Education Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP05-040, June 2005  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.9537&rep=rep1&type=pdf
25 Brian A. Jacob Lars Lefgren “The paper also speaks to the broader literature on subjective performance assessment. While such evaluations are central to promotion, retention and compensation decisions in most industries, they have received relatively little attention in the economics literature (Prendergast 1999).” p. 5 Dismissive Principals as Agents: Subjective Performance Measurement in Education Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP05-040, June 2005  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.9537&rep=rep1&type=pdf
26 Brian A. Jacob Lars Lefgren “The few studies that examine the correlation between principal evaluations and other measures of teacher performance, such as parent or student satisfaction, find similarly weak relationships (Peterson 1987, 2000).” p. 6, note 8 Dismissive Principals as Agents: Subjective Performance Measurement in Education Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP05-040, June 2005  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.9537&rep=rep1&type=pdf
27 Brian A. Jacob Lars Lefgren "As standards and accountability have become increasingly prominent features of the educational landscape, educators have relied more on remedial programs such as summer school and grade retention to help low-achieving students meet minimum academic standards. Yet the evidence on the effectiveness of such programs is mixed, and prior research suffers from selection bias." Denigrating Remedial Education and Student Achievement: A Regression-Discontinuity Analysis The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2004, Vol. 86, No. 1, Pages: 226-244 http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465304323023778#.WRSzmcm1vHF
28 Brian A. Jacob Steven D. Levitt “There has been very little previous empirical analysis of teacher cheating. ...Our paper represents the first systematic attempt to (1) identify the overall prevalence of teacher cheating empirically and (2) analyze the factors that predict cheating.” p. 845 1stness Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating Posted Online March 13, 2006. http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/Brian A. JacobLevitt2003.pdf
29 Brian A. Jacob Steven D. Levitt “Finally, this paper fits into a small but growing body of research focused on identifying corrupt or illicit behavior on the part of economic actors (see Porter and Zona [1993], Fisman [2001], Di Tella and Schargrodsky [2001], and Duggan and Levitt [2002]).” p. 871 Dismissive Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2003  http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/Brian A. JacobLevitt2003.pdf
30 Brian A. Jacob   “Despite this shift, there is relatively little evidence on the impact of public housing or housing vouchers on educational outcomes.” p. 1 Dismissive Public Housing, Housing Vouchers and Student Achievement: Evidence from Public Housing Demolitions in Chicago  Working Paper 9652, April 2003 http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6707824.pdf
31 Brian A. Jacob   “An important feature of most Section 8 programs including Gautreaux and MTO is that they involve voluntary relocation. Only a few studies examine forced relocation.”, p.1 Dismissive Public Housing, Housing Vouchers and Student Achievement: Evidence from Public Housing Demolitions in Chicago  Working Paper 9652, April 2003 http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6707824.pdf
32 Brian A. Jacob   "As the first large urban school district to introduce a comprehensive accountability system, [our city] provides an exceptional case study of the effects of high-stakes testing--a reform strategy that will become omnipresent as the No Child Left Behind Act is implemented nationwide." 1stness High Stakes in Chicago Education Next, v.1., p.66, 2003.  
33 Brian A. Jacob Melissa Roderick, Anthony Bryck "There has been little investigation of whether the purported benefits of these policies (of standardized grade promotion testing)-in the form of increased achievement on standardized tests-actually occur. ...We know very little about whether the introduction of high-stakes testing, particularly when combined with extra resources and with school accountability measures, will increase achievement on standardized tests for all students prior to the promotional gate (both those who are promoted as well as those who may later be retained." Dismissive The impact of high-stakes testing in Chicago on student achievement in the promotional gate grades. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 24(4):333-57, 2002.  
34 Brian A. Jacob Melissa Roderick, Anthony Bryck "In 1996, [our city's schools] became one of the first large, urban school districts to implement high-stakes testing, introducing a comprehensive accountability program that incorporated incentives for both students and teachers." 1stness The impact of high-stakes testing in Chicago on student achievement in the promotional gate grades. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 24(4):333-57, 2002.  
35 Brian A. Jacob Melissa Roderick, Anthony Bryck "In 1996, [our city] began a national trend when it coupled a new school-level accountability program with an accountability initiative with high-stakes consequences for students. ...Over the past five years, virtually every major school system and many states...have instituted elements of [our city's] policy." 1stness The impact of high-stakes testing in Chicago on student achievement in the promotional gate grades. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 24(4):333-57, 2002.  
36 Brian A. Jacob   "The recent federal education bill, No Child Left Behind, requires states to test students in grades three to eight each year, and to judge school performance on the basis of these test scores. While intended to maximize student learning, there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies." Dismissive Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools, Abstract, 2002. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 89, Issues 5Ð6, June 2005, Pages 761-796. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8968.pdf

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704001549
37 Brian A. Jacob   "Despite its increasing popularity within education, there is little empirical evidence on test-based accountability (also referred to as high-stakes testing)." Dismissive Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools, p. 2, 2002. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 89, Issues 5Ð6, June 2005, Pages 761-796. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8968.pdf

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704001549
38 Brian A. Jacob   "...most studies of school-based accountability do not utilize individual students data and thus cannot examine many outcomes of interest or investigate how effects vary across students." Denigrating Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools, p. 2, 2002. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 89, Issues 5Ð6, June 2005, Pages 761-796. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8968.pdf

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704001549
39 Brian A. Jacob   "...the federal government has moved to ensure a minimal level of testing and reporting that only a decade ago would have been unthinkable." Dismissive Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools, p. 2, 2002. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 89, Issues 5Ð6, June 2005, Pages 761-796. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8968.pdf

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704001549
40 Brian A. Jacob   “Nearly 20 years later, the debate surrounding MCT [minimum competency tests] remains much the same, consisting primarily of opinion and speculation.... A lack of solid empirical research has allowed the controversy to continue unchecked by evidence or experience... This paper... makes several improvements on the current literature by...” p. 99 Denigrating Getting Tough? The Impact of High School Graduation Exams Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Summer 2001, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 99-121 Google cache of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.407.5840&rep=rep1&type=pdf
41 Brian A. Jacob   The lack of empirical research on the achievement effects of mandatory graduation exams is striking, particularly in light of their growing popularity across the nation. The few studies that have examined the impact of MCT on student achievement tend to focus on younger children in low stakes testing environments.” p. 101 Dismissive Getting Tough? The Impact of High School Graduation Exams Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Summer 2001, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 99-121 Google cache of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.407.5840&rep=rep1&type=pdf
42 Brian A. Jacob   “...the evidence on graduation exams and achievement is limited and mixed, ....” p. 101 Dismissive Getting Tough? The Impact of High School Graduation Exams Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Summer 2001, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 99-121 Google cache of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.407.5840&rep=rep1&type=pdf
43 Brian A. Jacob   Kreitzer, Madaus, and Haney (1989) . . . .note that the positive correlation between state graduation test requirements and dropout rates is thought provoking, but that there is no solid empirical evidence for a causal link between test policy and dropout rates.” pp. 101–102 Dismissive Getting Tough? The Impact of High School Graduation Exams Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Summer 2001, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 99-121 Google cache of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.407.5840&rep=rep1&type=pdf
44 Brian A. Jacob   “More important, states and districts that implement such exams may have other policies or characteristics that act to reduce the probability of dropping out. Few studies have rigorously addressed this question.” p. 102 Dismissive Getting Tough? The Impact of High School Graduation Exams Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Summer 2001, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 99-121 Google cache of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.407.5840&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Author cites (and accepts without checking) someone elses dismissive review
Cite selves or colleagues in the group, but dismiss or denigrate all other work
Falsely claim that research has only recently been done on topic.